Certification of Pork Products by Nilsson, Tomas K.H. & Foster, Kenneth A.
 CERTIFICATION OF PORK PRODUCTS 
Tomas Nilsson and Ken Foster 
 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide insights on the welfare distributional impact on 
consumer and producer welfare resulting from the development and implementation of a 
credence certification program in the U.S. pork sector. The certification program can 
provide various levels of tracking and tracing in the marketing chain. The modeling 
framework follows that of Nilsson (2005), which encompasses product differentiation 
and substitution across meat products at the consumer level and across live animal types 
at the farm level. Processors and retailers have potentially bilateral market power and can 
supply either or both certified and conventional meat products. One of the key findings is 
that while as the conventional market contracts and the certified market expands as 
expected, the magnitude depends on whether suppliers are single-or multiproduct 
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An issue that has come to the forefront of economic inquiry today is the impact on 
consumer well-being from new product standards through voluntary certification and 
labeling programs. Certification programs are increasingly popular in the U.S. economy 
especially in the live animal industry foremost because of two factors. First, crucial food 
attributes are unverifiable and unobservable but important in the minds for some 
consumer segments.
1 There is immense pressure from the public and consumer interest 
groups on agribusinesses to meet concerns regarding credence qualities such as 
environmental degradation, food safety and animal welfare issues. Second, certification 
presents an opportunity for upstream suppliers, i.e. live animal producers to secure 
market access to profitable marketing opportunities and potentially alleviate oligopsony 
power in the live animal stages. 
In this vein, food credence certification can be of tremendous importance to food 
suppliers because it does not only meet consumer concerns but also provides access to 
potentially profitable niche-markets. For example, the National Pork Board has instituted 
voluntary programs such as the Pork Quality Assurance program (PQA), the Swine 
Welfare Assurance Program (SWAP), and the Take Care – Use Antibiotics Responsibly 
program. The PQA and Take Care programs were instituted in 1989 and 2004 
respectively to address proper antibiotic use on farms. SWAP started in 2003 as an effort 
to guarantee ethical live animal treatment on farms and in slaughter plants. Furthermore, 
the National Council of Chain Restaurants (NCCR), and the Food Marketing Institute 
(FMI) launched the Animal Welfare Audit Program (AWAP) in February 2004 to meet 
                                                 
1 Credence attributes are unobservable and unverifiable product characteristics (Darby 
and Karni, 1973).  
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the public concerns about the housing and treatment of animals on farms and in slaughter 
plants.
2 
Public decision-makers are also taking an active interest in implementing 
certification programs. For example, Texas A&M University developed in cooperation 
with industry representatives an animal welfare program targeted to live animal 
transporters. On a federal level, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies are 
controlling the National Organic Program (NOP), the Process Verification Programs 
(PVP), and the Country of Origin Labeling Act (COOL). The NOP stipulates the 
standards for organic food products, and uses independent auditors to certify compliance 
with the NOP guidelines. Compliance with the PVPs also uses third party auditors but 
program participants can design their own protocol. The COOL is a voluntary labeling 
scheme to inform the consumer about the country of origin for meat. Here, the retailer 
and the processor must document the country of origin for beef, lamb, pork, fish, 
perishable agricultural commodities and peanuts. The program will become mandatory 
on September 30, 2006.
3 
                                                 
2 However, the compelling question is whether these industry initiatives provide 
creditability for concerned consumers and add value for compliant pork producers 
because strict supplier compliance is not ensured. The auditor is unable to fine suppliers 
that are in violation of the protocols. Hence, a credible certification scheme most likely 
requires design and oversight by an independent and nonpartisan third party or a group 
with recognized authority in the certification area. Roller (2004) studies suitable 
certification programs that may be appropriate for Indiana pork producers. He suggests 
that certification protocols such as the Animal Welfare Guidelines of the Humane Farm 
Animal Care Group may be an appropriate choice for certification in the U.S. pork 
markets. 
3 Lack of political support is the main reason why the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
cannot implement the program. There is some discussion that the COOL may be 
implemented jointly with the National Animal Identification System, e.g. Anderson and 
Hudson (2004).  
 
4
However, the welfare distributional impact from certification and labeling 
programs in the U.S. food market is by in large an unresolved issue. Although there is 
concern about food safety, environmental degradation and animal welfare, not all 
consumers are willing to pay for a credence certification program that alleviates these 
concerns. Hence, the certified products may be imperfectly substitutable to the existing 
conventional food products on aggregate. The problem for the consumer that prefers the 
certification program is whether the new product enhances consumer welfare. The 
problem for the consumer that prefers the conventional product is whether the 
certification causes adverse price movements and therefore worsens consumer welfare in 
the conventional market. From the perspective of the live animal producer and the 
intermediary firm, the problem is that the certification may cause a consumer demand 
expansion or contraction. Specifically, the supplier problem is to choose to supply either 
in the conventional or the certified market or in both markets.
4 From a positive 
perspective, the intriguing question is how firm strategic behavior and preference 
heterogeneity determines economic efficiency and the distribution of welfare when 
suppliers launch a voluntary certification program. When the certified product does not 
fully replace the conventional product, the conventional market competes with its 
certified counterpart. The interaction between the certified and conventional markets may 
enhance or erode firm market power. Consequently, the welfare impact from the 
                                                 
4 Consumer well-being, consumer welfare or consumer surplus are utilized 
interchangeably throughout the paper and refer to the value in dollars that the consumer 
attach of being able to consume the particular product. Producer profitability, producer 




differentiation program depends on not only on relative prices and the distribution of 
consumers’ preferences but also on the competitive structure between firms.  
The objective of this study is to shed light on the economic implications of 
certification and labeling, with an application to the U.S. pork markets. The research 
question is, how does certification and labeling affect consumer and producer surplus 
when consumers have heterogeneous preferences and firms have market power? The 
hypothesis is that the welfare distributional impact on consumer and producer welfare is a 
function of individual consumer preferences, firm marginal cost as well as the 
competitive conduct in the industry. 
The certification program provides a pre-specified range of credence attributes, 
which are product quality attributes that are unverifiable from the consumer’s perspective 
but verified in a third-party independent auditing scheme. The certification program 
controls the presence of credence attributes as the product passes through the market 
stages. For example, the program may regulate or prohibit the usage of antibiotics, 
growth-promoting hormones, feed ingredients, regulate slaughtering practices and control 
retail shelf location.
5  
This study is counterfactual in nature, because as of April 2005, a national 
voluntary certification program is forthcoming in the U.S. pork markets.
6 The pork 
markets in this context involve the whole food supply chain from pork producers, 
packers, processors, distributors to retailers or other food outlets. The reference point is 
                                                 
5 Retail shelf space and location is a key predictor in determining the number of units 
sold for a particular good, see Corstjens and Doyle (1981). 
6 The analytical and numerical model however assumes that there is a small initial market 
share for the certified good. Currently a segment of niche-firms supplies pork products 
that provide credence guarantee. Moreover, these niche-firms are owned by larger 
conventional processing and retailing firms.   
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therefore the current market situation, which is referred to as the ex-ante equilibrium or 
the pre-certification market situation. The hypothetical equilibrium subsequent to the 
introduction of the certification program is referred to as the ex-post equilibrium, or the 
post-certification market situation. 
The analytical model builds on Random Utility Maximization (RUM) theory 
(McFadden, 1974). Aggregate demand and supply are found by aggregating individual 
demand and supply functions over the population. The product market in consideration in 
this analysis is the U.S. fresh cut pork markets, which involves the live animal (pork 
producer) stages, meatpacking and retailing industries. The meatpacking and retail 
industry is treated as an intermediate firm in this analysis. Market sources argue that the 
fresh cuts market represents the greatest market potential because the cuts are labeled in a 
uniform and consistent manner and included in the food pyramid. Additionally, the four 
largest meatpacking firms have a national scope and could potentially implement a food 
system wide certification scheme because they carry brands that are recognized by the 
consumers. 
Information about supply and demand for the ex-ante equilibrium is obtained 
from current prices and production levels. Demand information regarding the certified 
good originates from the stated preference study by Nilsson. The marginal cost of 
certification is approximated from cost studies of certification programs (Foster, 2004; 
Roller, 2004). Stakeholders in the agribusiness industry and policy makers considering 
implementing and supervising meat certification programs may find the results of 




Throughout, the following notation is employed. For notational convenience, 
denote scalars as lower- and uppercase letters, e.g.  X x, ; vectors are boldfaced lowercase 
letters, e.g.  [] ′ = m x x x ,... , 2 1 x ; matrices are boldfaced uppercase letters, e.g. X. 
Moreover, live animal and retail demand and supply is subscripted as ( ) R F, , 
respectively. Because the products are otherwise homogenous, we refer to the 
conventional product as the low (quality) product and the certified pork product as the 
high (quality) product denoted as ( ) H L, , respectively. The subsequent section reviews 
some of the previous conceptual and empirical studies. Chapter 3 presents the model and 
Chapter 5 continues with an empirical application. Chapter 6 concludes. 
2. Previous studies 
An important determinant of demand is the consumer perception of product 
quality. However, if some products are superior to others in the minds of the consumers 
the intriguing question that arise is what motivates a firm to become a multiproduct 
supplier instead of providing just the highest-quality variety? Lancaster (1990) provides a 
conceptual argument for the underlying motivations behind multiproduct behavior. In his 
view, there are foremost three factors that may explain multiproduct firm behavior, 
namely scope economies, entry-deterrence and providing better match between consumer  
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preferences and product attributes (1990: 201).
7 Gilbert and Matutes (1993) develop a 
model in which all consumers agree on the quality ranking to analyze the economic 
implications of a new product introduction. They find that all firms have incentive to 
introduce the maximum number of product varieties. From an entry deterrent perspective 
thus, the incumbent firm has incentive to prevent entry by “filling up” the product space.
8 
With respect to Lancaster’s third factor, the firm has incentives to increase total demand 
by providing a better match between heterogeneous consumers and differentiated 
products. Brander and Eaton (1984) build on this notion and coin the terms market 
segmentation and market interlacing. In market segmentation, multiproduct firms supply 
products that are close own-brand substitutes. In market interlacing however, firms 
supply products that compete with the competitor’s product. Brander and Eaton provide 
some intuition why firm would have this type of strategic behavior. They argue that firm 
strategic behavior can be regarded as a sequential three-stage game. In the first stage 
firms choose whether to entry or to stay out. In the second stage, firms make decisions 
about the product line. In the third stage, the firm maximizes profit with respect to price 
                                                 
7 The scope economies perspective comes derives Baumol, Panzar and Willig contestable 
market theory (Baumol, 1982; Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1983). The contestable market 
theory in its essence states that markets are always perfectly competitive. If there is free 
entry and incumbent firms earn positive economic profits, potential entrants have 
incentives to enter the market thus thereby lowering firm profits. However, if the 
incumbent firms have economies of scale and/or scope in production, there is some 
question to whether the economic outcome as stipulated by Baumol and Baumol, Willig 
and Panzar holds. Nevertheless, the notion of firm level economies of scale and scope 
argument is somewhat formalized by the latter authors. 
8 Two classical references in this direction are Schmalensee (1978) and Scherer’s (1979) 
studies of the 1972 case between Federal Trade Commission and, at that time, the three 
leading U.S. ready-to-eat breakfast cereals manufacturers. Schmalensee and Scherer 
argue that the incumbent firms engaged in product introduction to prevent new entry and 
altogether introduced more varieties than socially optimal. Hence, an excessive product 
introduction exceeded the benefits from matching heterogeneous consumer preferences 
with a diverse range of product attributes.  
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or quantities. They argue that their decision-making model hold particularly strong 
relevance for business decision makers picture because they “understand, before anything 
is actually produced, how the non-cooperative output game will work” (p.332). However, 
despite the fact that they provide a rigorous treatment of firm behavior, consumers are 
assumed having a quadratic utility function so the individual consumer would always 
prefer to consume several differentiated varieties see LaFrance (1985) and LaFrance and 
Hanemann (1989).  
In a similar fashion, Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985a, 1985b) study 
how the competitive behavior between suppliers changes when the option arises to serve 
two independent markets. They show that producer profit, as well as consumer surplus 
may decrease when firms segment the markets. However, there is no substitution in 
demand because the product markets are disconnected. 
The literature on food certification and labeling in imperfectly competitive 
environments take somewhat of a different route. Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) and 
others for example argue that the food marketplaces suffer from asymmetric information, 
“consumers may have misperceptions of the risks and hazards of consuming particular 
foods” (1996: 1248). They reckon, “Food producers will supply food quality if it is 
profitable for them or if they are required to do so. The contribution to profitability may 
stem from increased product differentiation, sales, perhaps price, or from avoidance of 
costly events such as food borne illness outbreak with associated tort liability” (1996: 
1248). Therefore, voluntary labeling and certification can increase total sales and provide 
a cost effective solution without government interference (1996: 1251).   
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Marette, Crespi and Schiavina (1999), and Crespi and Marette (2001 and 2002) 
also argue that the problem is one of asymmetric information but in addition there is 
imperfect competition involved too. The certified product is assumed superior to the 
conventional, or vertically differentiated: sold at same prices, all consumers would 
strictly prefer the certified product. While their policy implications are rather 
straightforward, the behavioral assumptions built in the model are important drivers of 
these results. For example, there is some controversy whether it is a problem of 
incomplete or asymmetric information. Gathering, analyzing and providing food quality 
information are costly activities for the firm. Antle (2001) argues that if firms are not 
required to collect this information there is a problem of incomplete information. 
Moreover, from a consumer standpoint, because consumers have heterogeneous 
preferences it is uncertain whether all consumers would prefer the certified product see 
also Antle (1996). Furthermore, Lutz (1997), Lutz, Lyon and Maxwell (2000) and 
Nilsson et al (2003) suggest that the functional forms of demand, production cost and 
type of strategic behavior drives the results in the vertical product differentiation model 
with vertical product differentiation. Additionally, in a real-world context the single-
product framework may hold little relevance, because retailers may choose to stock 
several product varieties. In this spirit, Sexton (2000) remarks that agricultural economics 
fails to incorporate the notion of multiple levels of market power and multiproduct 
technology.  
The model presented here capitalizes on some of the fundamental aspects brought 
up in the literature review that may influence the welfare distributional impact of a 
certification and labeling program. As suggested by Antle, not all consumers may prefer  
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the certified product because consumers have heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, 
there is no asymmetric information, rather one of imperfect information. Therefore, the 
certified product is relatively more expensive than the conventional product. Schroeter 
and Azzam, Perloff and Hyde and Sexton suggest that firms are potentially both 
multiproduct providers and have bilateral market power. In the model presented here, 
consumers have heterogeneous preferences, intermediary firms have market power and 
upstream firms may differ with respect to production costs.  
Figure I presents the economic unit of analysis, which is adapted from Nilsson 
and Foster (2004). The partial equilibrium economy consists of three types of agents: 
consumers, intermediary firms and upstream firms. The upstream firm is also referred to 
as the producer. The producer is involved in the primary production stage, and utilizes the 
production inputs capital, labor and land to produce an intermediary product. The 
intermediary firm, also referred to as the downstream firm, produces the finished good by 
using the intermediary product and other production inputs such as capital and labor. The 
consumer buys the finished good in the downstream consumer market. The downstream 
market is also referred to as the retail market.
9  
Consumers in this economy have potentially heterogeneous preferences. Without 
loss of generality, it is assumed that a consumer represented in the figure is one of three 
types. First, there is a distribution of consumers denoted as HIGH strictly prefers the 
certified finished good. This group may strictly prefer credence characteristics, be a high-
income group, exhibit high degrees of risk aversion, preferences for product attributes 
etc. Second, the consumer distribution denoted as LOW strictly prefers the conventional 
                                                 




finished good. The group may be extremely price sensitive and care relatively less about 
credence characteristics, further discussed below. The third group finally, denoted as the 
INDIFFERENT group consists of consumers that are price and credence characteristic 
sensitive. The purchase decision for the latter segment depends thus on the relative prices 
and the individual preferences for certification. Therefore, the demand encompasses thus 
aspects of both vertical and horizontal product differentiation because on aggregate, the 
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3. Partial Equilibrium Model 
The consumer face a set of discrete choices and maximize utility in a random-
utility fashion e.g. McFadden (1974).
10 All other economic activities are exogenous in 
this framework and referred to as the outside option or the outside good. In particular, the 
consumer maximizes utility by choosing the option that provides the highest level of 
utility. The options consist of buying and subsequently consuming one unit of 
conventional or certified pork chop, or purchase an outside good. The population consists 
of  N  consumers.
 The finite choice set each consumer faces is denoted as  {} O H L C , , = , 
where () L  refers to the conventional product, ( ) H  the certified product and finally ( ) O  
the outside option. Thus, this is an incomplete demand system because all other choices 
are aggregated into an outside option. The i
th product contains a vector of attributes 
[] ′ = i i i i P A B , , x , where  i B  is the brand dummy for the i
th product,  i A  the credence 
certification attribute dummy, and  i P  is the product price. The vector of attributes that 
                                                 
10 This model is similar to the one that is used by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in determining the consumer welfare impacts 
from mergers see Werden and Froeb (1994). The model presented here and the one used 
by DOJ and FTC both normalize the price of the outside good to zero (1994: 410). There 
are subtle differences, however. In the DOJ and FTC model for example, the market 
share for the outside good is a function of the aggregate demand elasticity and so is 
exogenous (1994: 410). In this paper, however, the market shares are endogenous. 
Additionally, the utility vector for the outside good is endogenous because it is a function 
of relative prices, market shares and elasticities, whereas the demand model by DOJ and 
FTC has normalized the utility vector for the outside good to a constant (1994: 411).  
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describe the conventional product is  [] ′ = L L L P B , 0 , x , the certified product 
[] ′ = H H H H P A B , , x  and the outside good is normalized to a zero vector so  [] ′ = 0 , 0 , 0 O x .  
The indirect utility function consists of a systematic utility component that may 
vary across individuals and an idiosyncratic error term that varies across individuals and 
product choices. Let the n
th individual’s observable utility component be the vector 
[] ′ = P n A n B n n , , , , , β β β β  where the subscript ( ) n  refers to the n
th individual, () B  the brand, 
() A  the credence attribute, and () P  the price, respectively. The idiosyncratic error term is 
distributed according to some distribution  ( ) Σ I, ~ ni u . The n
th consumer conditional 
indirect utility function for the i
th product is a function of the inner product of the utility 
vector and the product characteristics and an additive idiosyncratic error 
ni i ni u V + ′ = β x .           ( 1 )  
The product  β x ′ i  is the part-worth utility, also referred to as the systematic utility 
(Louviere, Hensher and Swait, 2000). The part-worth utility can be regarded as a base 
utility that all consumers receive independently on their location in the distribution. The 
total level of utility is also a function of the idiosyncratic error, however. If the error 
terms are IID double exponential the purchase probabilities becomes McFadden’s 
conditional Multinomial Logit, a.k.a. the MNL (McFadden, 1974; Andersson, de Palma 
and Thisse, 1991). The total direct demand for the i
th product is found by summing the 
purchase probabilities over the total market potential  R M  so total direct demand 
becomes, 
C i s M Q i R R i R . , , , ∈ = ,         ( 2 )   
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where  i R s ,  is the purchase probability,  ( ) C i M Q Q R i i i R i R . , , , ; , , ∈ = − x β x  is demand and 
the subscripts refers to the i
th finished or retail market, which is a function of all product 
characteristics, including prices, the utility vector ( ) β  and the total retail market size  R M . 
Inverse demand is found by solving for the prices in Equation (2). The indirect demand 
for the i
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− β φ .    (3) 
A final remark is important at this point. While the specification presented above 
is semi-logarithmic, there are subtle differences between this model and the linear 
demand model. Hausman suggests that linearized models are preferred over discrete 
demand models such as the logit presented here and the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz model. The 
reason is that the discrete demand models fare badly especially in an empirical context 
because it enforces an unreasonable substitution pattern (1994: 22-23).
11 However, the 
utility function that generates linear demands under the conditions stated above is 
quadratic so each consumer would strictly be better off consuming several product 
varieties.
12 
                                                 
11 Barry, Levinsohn and Pakes develop an empirical demand model from random utility 
theory that potentially has reasonable substitution patterns. However, the model does not 
have a closed form analytical solution. 
12 Moreover, for a linear demand system to be well- behaved and integrate to a proper 
utility function, the assumption of no income effects must be imposed, which is the first 
part of La France’s Theorem 2 (pp. 160).  
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Moreover, because income effects is not in the inverse demand, the area under the 
Marshallian demand curve but over the equilibrium price is the correct measure of 
consumer surplus.
13 
The upstream supplier, i.e. the live animal producer maximizes utility of profit 
and is a price-taker in the input and output markets. The production technology may be 
characterized by jointness in output so that one unit produced can be sold into different 
product markets. Because only one output market is of interest in this study it is assumed 
that the supplier can sell to two output markets, one aggregate output market and the one 
studied here. The demand for the aggregate market is assumed perfectly elastic. The 
producer per-unit profit is, 
() i i i i i i w r z r z − − + = 0 1 1 π ,        ( 4 )  
where the subscript denote the activity choice, ( ) 0 1, i i r r  denote the prices the supplier 
receives for the i
th product from each product market and ( ) i w  is the constant marginal 
cost of production. The superscript on the output prices refers to the product market, 
where 1 is the active product market of study in this analysis and 0 the constant market. 
The index () i z  refers to the share of one unit of output that is allocated to the active 
market,  [] 1 , 0 ∈ i z . The per-unit profit can be seen as a residual claim left to cover other 
economic costs not directly attributed to a particular production activity.   
The producer faces the same choice set as the consumer, denoted as 
{} O H L C , , = . It is natural to refer to the choice set as production activities, which are 
                                                 
13 Nilsson derives the analytical expression for the consumer surplus. Comparative statics 
on the surplus expressions are ambiguous however, because exogenous terms appear in 
both the numerator and the denominator.   
 
18
conventional () L , certified () H  intermediary products, or participates in an outside 
activity () O . The latter production activity is referred to in this analysis as the outside 
option.
14 Hence, the utility maximization problem for the n
th supplier for the i
th product 
becomes, 
() ( ) ni i i ni i ni ni v w r z r z U + − − + = 0 1 1 π ,     (5) 
where  ni v  is an idiosyncratic utility error term that may vary across suppliers and 
production activities. The share of output allocated to the active market may differ across 
production volume and suppliers. For purpose of analytical tractability however, the 
share parameter, the production costs and the other aggregate market is held constant. 
Moreover, the idiosyncratic error term is assumed following an IID double exponential 
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+ = − α α .    (6)   
The producer surplus is calculated as the area over the supply curve under the 
equilibrium price level. The surplus is Ricardian Rent, i.e. return to quasi-fixed 
production factors see discussion in Schmitz et al (2002). 
The intermediary firms play a Cournot-Nash-Novshek game, in which each firm 
maximizes profit with respect to output levels with a constant marginal cost of 
transforming the live animal into a retail product. The profit maximization problem for 
the n
th firm is, 
                                                 
14 See Lusk and Hudson (2004), and Windle and Rolfe (2005) for a recent empirical 
application of RUM theory in a supplier context.  
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( ) () ( )
() () n H H n L L L H H n L H L L
n H L H H n L H L L n H n L
q c q c q Q Q r q Q Q r
q Q Q P q Q Q P q q Max
n H , , ,
, , , ,
, , ,
, , ,
− − − −
+ = π
, (7) 
where  ( ) j i i Q Q P ,  and  ( ) j i i Q Q r ,  are the inverse demand and supply, respectively,  n i q ,  
the n
th firm output, and  i c  the firm’s constant marginal cost of production for 
() j i H L j i ≠ = , , , . Note that this formulation also encompasses the single product firm’s 
optimization problem by omitting the expressions ( ) j j j n j c r P q , , , , . For the multiproduct 
firm, there are two first order conditions. Dropping the subscript for the firm to avoid 



































































,   (8) 
for () j i H L j i ≠ = , , , . The expression  () ( ) ( )
1 1 1 − − − − − − H L F i L F i Q Q M Q Q M q β  is the 
own-product markup whereas  ( )
1 1 − −
− − − H L R i Q Q M q β  is the cross-product markup in the 
downstream markets. Consequently, in the multiproduct case, products in the product mix 
can influence several product markets simultaneously. The expression 
() ( ) ()
1 1 1 − −
−
− − − − H L F i i F i Q Q M Q Q M qα  is the own-product markdown and 
()
1 1 − −
− − − H L F i Q Q M q α  the cross-product markdown. If the firm is a single-product 
provider, the cross-product expressions cancel. If the conventional and certified product 
are homogeneous, the first order conditions would reduce to those stated by previous 
researchers, e.g. Appelbaum, Azzam and Sexton where the price spread is determined by  
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the own price elasticity of demand, the supply elasticity, as well as the conjectural 
elasticities in the output and input markets.  
Here, however, the new product introduction may have a countervailing market 
power effect in several markets, i.e. the markup (markdown) in the output (input) market 
may decrease as the degree of product differentiation increases. This occurs because of 
the increased substitution possibilities provided to consumers (upstream suppliers) in the 
downstream (upstream) market. Therefore, in the first order condition, the first term on 
the right hand side and the first term on the left hand side of the equality sign is referred 
to as the direct or own-competitive effect, whereas the second term is referred to as the 
indirect or cross-competitive effect. It is therefore plausible that for the multiproduct 
firm, there may be strong anti- or pro-competitive effects in the post-certification 
scenario. 
There are a total of () n  intermediary firms in the certified and conventional 
markets. In the ex-ante scenario, the certified market is assumed perfectly competitive. 
Therefore, in the ex-ant scenario with single-product intermediary firms, there are () 2 n  
firms that can influence the conventional upstream and downstream prices through their 
strategic behavior whereas the () 2 n  intermediary firms in the certified market are price-
takers. In the ex-post scenario however, the intermediary firms in the certified market can 
influence the market price through their strategic behavior. The ex-ante scenario is 
plausible in circumstances where the intermediary firm applies a simple cost-plus pricing 
for the certified product while it is in its maturing stages. The ex-post scenario can thus 
represent a situation where the manager knows more about the market conditions and can 
price the certified product accordingly to his optimizing behavior.  
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4. An Application: U.S. Pork 
The partial equilibrium model presented above is applied in the U.S. pork market. 
The intermediary firm processes the live animal to a finished consumer good, fresh pork 
cuts. The markets for other pork products are held constant in the analysis. The 
certification program can control a particular product attribute or the processes by which 
the product passes through the marketing channel. The program may for example 
regulate, or prohibit the usage of antibiotics, growth-promoting substances, enforce 
environmental compliance, require humane animal treatment in production, regulate the 
retail-shelf location, etc.  
It is assumed that the intermediary industry-C4 is 100 percent, so four firms 
operate in the market. It is assumed that the intermediary firm is either perfectly 
competitive, a single-product bilateral oligopolistic firm or a multiproduct bilateral 
oligopolistic firm.
 15 
Total consumption of pork chop is derived from public sources. For the last 
recorded year, 2003, the total consumption pork in carcass weight was 19.4 billion 
pounds. The retail price for the conventional pork cut is 3.45 dollars per pound see 
Nilsson for details. In 2003, the average farm price received for pork is 0.70 dollars per 
pounds. The loin consists of 18% of the carcass (NPB, 2005). In this study, it is assumed 
that only the pork loin can be labeled. It is however, a conservative level because up to 
50% of the carcass can potentially be uniquely certified and labeled. The conversion 
factor carcass to retail weight is 0.78 (ERS, 2005). Consumption of loin in retail weight is 
therefore 2.71 billion pounds. The initial market share for certified is set at 5 percent of 
                                                 
15 See Nilsson for scenarios that are more elaborate. The scenarios presented here, 
however, encompasses the results presented in Nilsson.  
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total current consumption, 0.14 billion pounds. Nilsson describes the procedure for which 
the demand, supply and intermediary firm marginal cost functions are parameterized and 
Table 1 displays the results from calibrating demand and supply using the baseline data. 
Table 1. Calibrated Inverse Demand and Supply Functions.  
  Variable  Units  Conventional Certified None 
          
DEMAND Intercept    2.91*  3.57*  --- 
 Slope  coefficient    -1.52  -1.52  --- 
 Price   $/lbs  3.45*  6.13  0.00* 
  Quantity   billion lbs  2.58*  0.14*  5.85 
 Market  share    %  30.0  2.00  68.0 
          
SUPPLY Intercept    1*  3.58  --- 
 Slope  coefficient    0.08  0.08  --- 
 Price   $/lbs  0.70*  1.33  0.00* 
  Quantity   billion lbs  2.58*  0.14*  46.3 
 Market  share    %  5.30  0.20  94.5 
Notes: The figures are rounded. Total consumption in carcass weight is 19.4 billion 
pounds (bn lbs). The loin consists of 18% of the carcass. The conversion factor carcass to 
retail weight is 0.78. Consumption of loin in retail weight is 2.71 bn lbs. Fixed variables 
denoted by a “*”. Initial market share for certified is set at five percent of total current 
consumption, 0.14 bn lbs. Total retail market size (MR) is 8.57 and total farm market size 
(MF) is 49.0 bn lbs. Sources: USDA, NPB and author’s calculation. 
The retail price premium for the certified good is 78 percent (=6.13/3.45-1), 
whereas the farm price premium is somewhat higher at 90 percent. Because of the joint-
ness in output, the farm price represents the price for just a share of one unit of output. 
That is, if the farmer supplies one certified live animal to the retail market, the total price 
the farmer receives is  () H H w r z z − − + = 0 1 33 . 1 π , where z  is the share of live animal 
that can be sold as pork chops, i.e. 18 percent, and ( ) H w r , 0  the price received for the 
other parts of the live animal and the production costs per live animal, respectively.   
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The calibrated marginal cost for the conventional multiproduct, single-product 
and perfectly competitive firm is 2.33, 2.34 and 2.75 pounds per pound. The certified 
marginal cost is 5.75, 5.97 and 6.31 dollars per pound. However, in the ex-post scenario, 
the constant marginal cost for the certified products is assumed fifty percent higher than 
the conventional marginal cost. Note that this assumption implies that the certified 
marginal cost decreases in comparison to its ex-ante counterpart and the certified cost 
decreases by 39, 58 and 35 percent, respectively. The relative reduction in marginal cost 
can be motivated for two reasons. First, because the conventional and certified products 
are otherwise homogonous and the certification program is launched in a national scale, 
the certified supply chain can utilize the conventional supply channels. There are 
anecdotal evidences that smaller firms have higher (constant) marginal cost of production 
because of differences in production technology. Antle (2001: 315) shows that smaller 
domestic processing firms have relatively higher variable production costs because of 
technological differences. For example, the mean average animal and labor cost for the 
small pork processing plants is 0.72, whereas 0.63 dollar per pound for large plants. 
Large plants are defined as supplying more than 100 million pounds annually. 
Additionally, Ollinger et al (2005) discusses the structural changes in the U.S. meat 
supply chain and suggest that small firms exit over time because they have relatively 
higher production costs than the larger counterparts. Therefore, it is assumed that the ex-
post suppliers adopts the conventional production and processing technologies and 
thereby manage to lower production costs. Anecdotal evidence seems to support this 
argument for certified firms that currently are serving markets with credence guaranteed 
meat products, moreover these niche firms are privately owned by the large-scale  
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processing firms. Second, economic feasibility studies of certification indicate that an 
animal certification program shifts the processor-retailer’s marginal cost by at most fifty 
percent relative to conventional production (Roller, 2004; Foster, 2004). 
5. Discussion of Results and Findings 
Figure II depicts the demand and supply shifts in the conventional market under 
perfect competition. Consumers and producers switch from the conventional market to 


























Figure II. The Conventional Market under Perfect Competition.  
The downward sloping demand curve is labeled “D”, the upward sloping supply curve 
“S” is the sum of the marginal cost of processing and the farm supply. The dotted lines 
represent the ex-ante scenario and the bold lines the ex-post scenario. Source: author’s 
calculation. 
In the certified market, the retail price decreases by 15 percent from 7.64 to 6.53 
dollars per pound. The farm price increases by 81 percent from 1.33 to 2.40 dollars per 
























Figure III. The Certified Good Market under Perfect Competition.  
The downward sloping demand curve is labeled “D”, the upward sloping supply curve 
“S” is the sum of the marginal cost of processing and the farm supply. The dotted lines 
represent the ex-ante scenario and the full lines the ex-post scenario. Source: author’s 
calculation. 
As seen in Figure III there is a relatively smaller shift in demand than the shift in 
supply. Two factors cause a shift in the downstream supply, which is an aggregation of 
upstream producer supply and intermediary firm marginal cost. The first factor is the 
reduction in the intermediary firm’s marginal cost. The marginal cost for the certified 
good decreases from 6.31 to 4.13 dollars per pound. Thus, the certified supplier marginal 
cost is 50 percent above the conventional it is a net reduction of 53 percent in comparison 
to the ex-ante scenario. The second factor is that upstream producers exit the 
conventional markets and enter the certified market.  
Table 2 displays the new ex-post equilibrium levels for all three scenarios.   
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Table 2. Ex-Post Equilibrium.  
 Perfect  Competition Single-product Multiproduct 
Total volume (bn lbs)  3.14 3.36 3.05 
Relative market share  0.27 0.40 0.29 
Conventional      
Quantity (bn lbs)  2.46 2.40 2.36 
Retail price ($/lbs)  3.43 3.42 3.47 
Farm price ($/lbs)  0.68 0.66 0.65 
Marginal cost ($/lbs)  2.75 2.20 2.33 
Certified      
Quantity (bn lbs)  0.67 0.97 0.69 
Retail price ($/lbs)  6.53 6.26 6.52 
Farm price ($/lbs)  2.40 2.64 2.41 
Marginal cost ($/lbs)  4.13 3.30 3.50 
Notes: The single- and multiproduct scenarios refer to the 4-firm bilateral oligopoly. 
Source: author’s calculation. 
The largest ex-post total consumption, measured as conventional plus certified 
volume, resides in the single-product bilateral oligopoly case, whereas the multiproduct 
case has the lowest ex-post volume. In perfect competition, however, the conventional 
volume is the largest of the three scenarios. The reason is that the imperfectly competitive 
firms can restrain the conventional output. In particular, the multiproduct firm restrains 
output relatively more than does the single-product firm. Moreover, the certified volume 
in the imperfectly competitive regime is relatively higher than in perfect competition. The 
driving reason why these differences are observed is that the firm optimality conditions 
are functions of relative prices and costs as well as firm conduct. The impact of 
certification relative to the ex-ante equilibrium becomes clearer upon calculating the 
percentage change in prices and quantities depicted in Table 3.  
 
28
Table 3. Percentage Changes in Equilibrium Prices and Quantities.  
 Perfect  Competition Single-product  Multiproduct 
Total volume (bn lbs)  16 24 13 
Conventional      
Quantity (bn lbs)  -4 -7 -8 
Retail price ($/lbs)  -1 -1 0 
Farm price ($/lbs)  -3 -5 -7 
Certified      
Quantity (bn lbs)  398 614 409 
Retail price ($/lbs)  -15 -18 -15 
Farm price ($/lbs)  81 99 81 
Notes: The single- and multiproduct scenarios refer to the 4-firm bilateral oligopoly. 
Source: author’s calculation. 
From the table it is clear that while as there is an expansion of total consumption 
in the ex-post environment the changes in each of the markets is relatively different. For 
example, for the multiproduct case the conventional market contracts relatively more and 
the certified market expands relatively less than in perfect competition. This change is 
accompanied by a relatively larger decrease in conventional farm price and an unchanged 
retail price. This effect is caused by the fact that the multiproduct provider can influence 
the price-spread through its direct and indirect effect. However, as indicated earlier, 
although the multiproduct firm profit is lower than for the equivalent single-product case, 
the multiproduct firm appears to be somewhat more resilient to change, i.e. it manages to 
withhold its grip on both markets. This resilience to change can be seen in the single-
product case above where the conventional retail and farm prices decrease as much as in 
perfect competition. Continuing, in the certified market, the prices in the multiproduct 
and perfect competition case increased nearly the same amount, however, the volume 
increased more in the former case. In the single-product case, there is a relatively larger  
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expansion in output and the price-spread shrunk relatively more than in the multiproduct 
case. The relative changes in welfare are summarized in Table 4 below. 
Table 4. Percentage Changes in Welfare.  
   Perfect  Competition Single-product  Multiproduct 
Conventional CS  -4 -6 -8 
 PS  -4 -7 -8 
 Profit    -12 7 
 TW  -4 -6 -5 
Certified CS  422 668 433 
 PS  401 621 412 
 TW  412 1036 655 
Both markets  CS  14 23 10 
 PS  15 24 12 
 Profit    27 46 
 TW  15 24 19 
Notes: The single- and multiproduct scenarios refer to the 4-firm bilateral oligopoly. CS 
is consumer surplus; PS is producer surplus; Profit is intermediary firm profit; TW is the 
sum of consumer and producer surplus and intermediary firm profit. In the multiproduct 
case, the profit row in the both market section is total intermediary firm profits; the profit 
row in the conventional and certified section refers to the profit that accurse to the firm in 
the aforementioned markets. Source: author’s calculation. 
As depicted by the table, the distributional impact from certification on consumers 
and producers depends on the competitive structure of the industry. For both the single- 
and multiproduct firm, conventional consumers and producers surplus decreases 
relatively more than in perfect competition. For the multiproduct firm, consumer and 
producer surplus decrease relatively more than in the single product case. Moreover, the 
multiproduct firm profit increase in the conventional market whereas profit decreases for 
the conventional single-product firm. In the certified market, consumer and producer 
surplus increase more than in the other two scenarios.   
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On aggregate therefore, consumer and producer surplus increase relatively more 
in the single-product than the multiproduct or perfect competition scenario. Moreover, 
multiproduct firm profit increases relatively more than in the other two scenarios. Total 
welfare, measured as the sum of consumer and producer surplus and intermediary firm 
profits, increases the most in the single-product scenario because of the relatively larger 
expansion in the certified market.  
6. Summary 
Introducing a voluntary certification and labeling program in a marketplace where 
consumers have heterogeneous preferences and firms have potentially market power lead 
to a situation in which the certified product cannot replace the conventional product. 
Although the certified good market expanded by between 400 to 800 percent, the 
conventional market remained quite large in the ex-post equilibrium. Thus, the certified 
good could not replace the conventional product. Two determinants drive this result, 
namely the distribution of consumer preferences and the upward sloping marginal cost 
curve. There is a welfare increase by 15 percent in the perfect competition scenario. 
Moreover, in comparison to a situation where the intermediary firms are single product 
versus multiproduct providers, the model predicts that the multiproduct firm retains some 
market power ex-post certification. The numerical results indicate that markets become 
more competitive when firms are single product providers. In particular, the multiproduct 
provider can cause a price increase in the conventional market despite the demand 
contraction. The primary driver of this result comes from the fact that the firm can control 
the output in both markets via a direct and indirect effect that act as a pro-competitive  
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dampening effect. This insight may be in somewhat contrast to Brander and Eaton’s 
discussion. They argue, “A fairly common historical pattern is for firms to expand the 
scope of their product offerings and compete more directly with each other as the market 
grows” (1984, p.323). However, the results presented here indicate that markets become 
relatively more competitive when firms are single product providers. The mere fact that 
the firm can influence the market via the direct and indirect effect softens the 
competition.  
In summary, the contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, the firm strategic 
behavior boils down to a simultaneous decision process, rather than sequential, via the 
mere formulation of the optimization problem. Although Brander and Eaton argue that 
sequential managerial decision processes are more realistic, it is not exactly the 
contention of the workings of the studied industry. Firm strategic behavior is a 
simultaneous process and not sequential. Second, the partial equilibrium economy is 
consistent with utility maximization theory in which the consumers have heterogeneous 
preferences and regard products as both vertically and horizontally differentiated. This is 
an important distinction from previous studies. Stole derives the firm optimality 
conditions in terms of elasticities. However, in our model, there is a shift in demand and 
supply so the formulation provides little guidance. Gilbert and Matutes work in a vertical 
product differentiation framework, whereas in this study, consumers have heterogeneous 
preferences and thus value products differently.  
The third contribution is that the study provides guidance to the stakeholders in 
the industry. The certification program may be a profitable strategy that ensures market 
access, alleviates market power, and expands the consumer-end market. While the model  
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predicts that a lion’s share of total consumption comes from the conventional supply 
chain, the certified product market does expand. A pork producer weighting the pros and 
cons of engaging in a certification program should consider its own cost of production. If 
the pork producer cannot commit to the certification program, she may incur a surplus 
loss. For the packer-retailer, the program may be a profitable strategy that matches 
heterogeneous consumer demand preferences with extensive certified and conventional 
product diversification. Thus, by supplying products with different product attributes, 
firms differentiate among different consumers on basis of their different willingness to 
pay for different product attributes. 
For policy makers, the model offers insight on whether the program reduces the 
intermediary firms’ abilities to influence the market price via its strategic behavior. An 
increase of the product variety may provide a better match between consumers with 
heterogeneous tastes and products with different quality attributes. Hence, consumers 
concerned about the environment, animal welfare and antibiotic residues may find the 
program beneficial as the retailer supply products that better match their preferences, 
hence enhance their well-being.
16 
                                                 
16 Moreover, the economic model presented here does not capture the potential economic 
benefits that the certification may provide from reducing or eliminating economic 
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